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Introduction 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) impacts millions of American 
during their working lives and at retirement.
1
  Indeed, ERISA has profound implications for 
health care, as an “estimate[ed] . . . 1.9 million beneficiaries of ERISA plans have [their] health 
care claims denied each year[.]”2  Approximately 45% of private workers in America are plan 
participants in defined contribution plans.
3
  Defined benefit plans cover approximately 35 
million private and public workers.
4
  In 2011, 30 million employees were covered by multi-
employer plans.
5
  An excess of 150 billion in assets are held in reserve for beneficiaries and 
private plan participants, that have escaped the scrutiny of effective federal regulation.
6
 
Since ERISA’s enactment, federal circuit courts have continuously disagreed on ERISA 
provisions. One such disagreement concerns the standard of judicial review as applied to claims 
arising out of ERISA plan interpretation.
7
  Specifically, numerous federal circuits have divided 
on the issue of whether the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review applies to all or 
some practices of fiduciary plan interpretation in ERISA plans that grant discretionary 
                                                          
1
 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
2
 CAROLE ROAN GRESENZ, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, DAVID M. STUDDERT, BONNIE DOMBEY-MOORE & NICHOLAS M. 
PACE, A Flood of Litigation?: Predicting the Consequence of Changing Legal Remedies Available to ERISA 
Beneficiaries, IP 184, RAND HEALTH LAW, (2006), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP184.pdf. 
3
 PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT, http://www.pbgc.gov/res/reports/ar2013.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2014). See also PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION ANNUAL, 
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/pension-insurance-data-tables-2011.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (Pension 
Insurance Data). 
4
 Id.  
5
 COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE § 8 (3rd ed. 2011). 
6
 Id. 
7
 See generally Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013); and see John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing 
Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
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interpretative authority upon the plan administrator.
8
  Plan interpretation encompasses several 
practices within ERISA, such as, among others, benefit determinations, determining the scope of 
fiduciary responsibility, implementing administrative rules to a plan, or determining formula for 
benefits calculation.
9
 
In ERISA civil cases, the standard of judicial review results in evidentiary implications 
that are highly outcome determinative.
10
  The Supreme Court’s Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. 
Bruch, 489 US 101 (1989), decision dealt with the issue of the standard of judicial review for 
denial of benefits claims.
11
  Firestone held that the de novo standard of judicial review controlled 
review of denial of benefits claims unless the plan granted discretionary authority upon the 
administrator, which would result in the application of an arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review.
12
   
The Ninth, Third, Sixth, and Second Circuits have weighed in on when the arbitrary and 
capricious standard applies to interpretative powers outside the denial of benefits context when a 
plan grants interpretative power upon the plan administrator.  The Ninth Circuit has recently 
joined the inconsistency among the circuits.
13
  The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Firestone and its 
progeny to mean that plan language providing fiduciaries discretion grants uninhibited 
discretionary authority over all matters concerning plan interpretation, including and beyond 
denial of benefit claims, thus cloaking fiduciaries with the arbitrary and capricious standard on 
                                                          
8
 See Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc., 220 F.3d at 702 (6th Cir. 2000), Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3rd Cir. 
1995), Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013), and John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. 
Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
9
 Id. 
10
 See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 US 101 (1989). 
11
 Firestone, 489 US 101, 111 (1989). 
12
 Firestone, 489 US 101, 111 (1989); See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); and see Conkright v. 
Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010). 
13
 See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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any plan interpretation decision.
14
  The Second Circuit has refused to expand the arbitrary and 
capricious standard in Firestone beyond the denial of benefits context.
15
  The Third and Sixth 
Circuits justify the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard outside of the denial of 
benefits context, but do not state how far the arbitrary and capricious standard should apply to 
plan interpretation.
16
  
Considering most workers do not save enough for retirement, creating remedial 
safeguards to protect what little monies these workers have is critical to our nation’s financial 
future. Even though ERISA has been amended to include criminal provisions, “the protection 
accomplished by statute has not been sufficient to accomplish Congressional intent.”17 Equally 
important are the promotion and creation of ERISA plans by employers. This comment proposes 
that the arbitrary and capricious standard should be applied to all plan interpretation practices, 
and as a result reviewing courts should adopt broader remedial safeguards to protect plan 
participants and beneficiaries. For example, a court should adopt broader remedial safeguards by 
considering any and all relevant factors that may help the court determine whether a plan 
administrator’s acts are arbitrary and capricious.  
                                                          
14
 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1077 (9th Cir. 2013). 
15
 See John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2nd Cir. 1994), and see 
Frommert v. Conkright, 738 F.3d 522, (2nd Cir. 2013) (A claim that is outside of the denial of benefits context, if 
not already held to adopt an arbitrary and capricious standard, requires review from a higher court to determine 
the appropriate standard of review.); See generally Hammer v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3414 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2005) (Discretion is conferred upon the administrator when the plan grants such 
discretion. An exception has not been carved out to revert to de novo review if the claim is not a denial of benefits 
claim. Hammer involved a denial of benefits claim and a claim for untimely decision rendered from the plan’s 
appeals process.); See, e.g., Asbestos Workers Syracuse Pension Fund by Collins v. M.G. Indus. Insulation Co., 
875 F. Supp. 132 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (The arbitrary and capricious standard of review applies to denial of benefits 
claims when the plan grants discretion upon the trustee. After John Blair a distinction between claims arising from 
denial of benefits and claims not arising from denial of benefits arose. The arbitrary and capricious standard was 
not applied to administrative determinations balancing the interest of plan beneficiaries because the claim was not 
a denial of benefits claim. Instead, a strict prudent person standard was applied to the administrator’s interest 
determination.). 
16
 Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 2000). Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3rd Cir. 1995). 
17
 MEDILL, supra note 5, at §8.  
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This comment reviews the origin of, and hence the policy behind, the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, while identifying the extent to which deference is granted upon 
fiduciaries on plan interpretation among several circuits. Part I of this comment provides a 
background to Congress’s intent in enacting ERISA and the subsequent adoption of trust law to 
fill in gaps in ERISA’s remedial provisions.  Part II further investigates the meaning of the 
modern arbitrary and capricious standard as applied to ERISA. Part II sets forth the Supreme 
Court Firestone decision and its progeny, which create the contours for ERISA judicial review 
analysis. Part III identifies and captures the split between the Ninth, Sixth, Third, and Second 
Circuits. In part IV, this comment proposes a resolution to the imbalance between promotion of 
plan creation and legal simplicity, and the safeguards afforded to plan participants and 
beneficiaries in the administrative appeals process and judicial arena. Specifically, this article 
posits that the arbitrary and capricious standard should continue to control the review of all plan 
administrators’ discretionary interpretation while simultaneously recommending a broad review 
of any and all relevant factors in reviewing an administrator’s decision, which would increase 
remedial safeguards for plan participants and increase the likelihood of a court finding an 
arbitrary and capricious act.  
I. Background 
1. ERISA: Legislative Intent at the Time of Creation - 1974 
Congress enacted ERISA to protect plan participants and plan beneficiaries who were due 
benefits but never paid because either the employer had inadequate funding or the employer 
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determined that benefits would not disburse because of some obscure language in the plan.
18
  
Congress’s intent is clear. ERISA is “designed to remedy certain defects in the private retirement 
system which limit the effectiveness of the system in providing retirement income security.”19  In 
ERISA’s Congressional findings and policy declaration, Congress states: “[o]wing to the lack of 
. . . adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees 
and their beneficiaries . . . that safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, 
operation, and administration of such plans . . . .”20  “[T]he policy of [ERISA is] to protect . . . 
the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by . . . providing 
for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”21  ERISA’s intent, in 
part, is to remedy pre-ERISA obstacles that hindered effective enforcement of fiduciary duties 
and to provide legal and equitable remedies to recover due benefits.
22
  
Congress is also concerned with the careful balance of setting equitable standards and 
promoting the expansion of ERISA plans.
23
  Congress implemented its objective by erecting 
preemption provisions,
24
 replacing state laws,
25
 and providing state and federal venue for claim 
adjudication. Ultimately, ERISA codifies efforts to protect participants’ and beneficiaries’ rights 
under qualified
26
 ERISA plans.
27
 
                                                          
18
 Carlton R. Sickles, Introduction: The Significance and Complexity of ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 205 
(1975), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol17/iss2/2. 
19
 MEDILL, supra note 5, at §6 (quoting House of Representative Report No. 93-533 (1973)).   
20
 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2013). 
21
 MEDILL, supra note 5, at §6 (quoting House of Representative Report No. 93-533 (1973)). 
22
 H.R. REP. NO. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; See S. REP. NO. 
127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871. 
23
 MEDILL, supra note 5, § 7.  
24
 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); MEDILL, supra note 5, at § 7.  
25
 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061, 1081-1086, 1101-1114 (1988).  H.R. REP. NO. 533, at 5-8, reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4643-46. 
26
 Qualified status is unique to the I.R.C., which labels a plan as securing preferential tax benefits after satisfying 
numerous requirements specified by ERISA. (26 U.S.C. § 401). The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 set specific 
requirements for employers to qualify for favorable tax treatment to the employer and plan participants. See I.R.C. 
§§ 1-9833 (2013). 
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Throughout ERISA’s general provisions, Congress states clearly that ERISA’s overall 
theme controls future enactments and guides interpreting courts.
28
  ERISA’s overall theme 
prescribes the careful balance of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries and the promotion 
of plan creation.
29
  Thus, any extension or interpretation of ERISA must carry out its purpose, 
which fundamentally includes providing adequate remedial protections to plan participants and 
beneficiaries.
30
  
2. ERISA’s Place in Employee Benefits: Statutory Background 
The need to protect employees through legislative enactments dates back to the early 
twentieth century.
31
  At the heel of industrialism, employers were managing revenue without 
regard to its employees’ future taking advantage of the fact that the common laborers were 
generally unaware of retirement planning.
32
  As a result, Congress fashioned numerous 
legislative enactments throughout the twentieth century to promote the enactment of retirement 
plans and to protect employees and their beneficiaries.  
In the 1920’s, Congress created incentives for companies who established retirement 
plans by providing tax deductions.
33
  In the 1930’s, employers disproportionately contributed to 
the retirement funds of highly compensated employees.
34
  In 1935, the Social Security Act was 
enacted and served as our nation’s main and often sole retirement income.35  In 1958, the 
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was enacted to increase protection to plan participants 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27
 See S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973) reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871; See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, 
at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639. 
28
 P.L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat 829 (1974). 
29
 Id. 
30
 Id. 
31
 Christopher Carosa, 7 DEADLY SINS EVERY ERISA FIDUCIARY MUST AVOID: THE 1ST DEADLY SIN – “INCOME 
MATTERS,” http://fiduciarynews.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
32
 Id. 
33
 MEDILL, supra note 5, at § 3.  
34
 Id.  
35
 Id. 
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and beneficiaries.
36
  In the 1960’s, long vesting requirements and harsh break in service rules 
negated much needed retirement funds to plan participants.
37
 
Finally, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 
1974.
38
 ERISA, as a body of employee benefits law, arises from two distinct federal statutes: 1) 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974;
39
  and 2) the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986.
40
  ERISA primarily regulates employer-sponsored retirement, health care, disability, and 
other welfare benefit plans.
41
  ERISA covers Defined Contribution Plans, Defined Benefit Plans, 
and Welfare Plans.
42
  Define Contribution Plans include 401(k) plans, 403 (b) plans, Employee 
Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP), Stock Bonus Plans, Simple IRA Plans, Profit-Sharing Plans, 
and Simplified Employee Pension Plans.
43
  Defined Benefit Plans are generally referred to as 
Pension Plans, which include Cash Balance Plans.
44
 
A qualified ERISA retirement plan is comprised of several working components. 
Generally, a qualified plan will involve the participation of the employer, the plan administrator, 
the trustee, and the plan participant or beneficiary.
45
  The employer is the only one with the right 
to create the plan and who, generally, contributes to it.
46
  The plan administrator manages the 
                                                          
36
 Id. at 5. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Sat. 829 (1974), codified as amended in various sections of 26 and 29 United States Code.  
available at http://www.house.gov/legcoun/Comps/ERISA_CMD.pdf. 
39
 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2013). 
40
 See I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (2013). 
41
 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2013). 
42
 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2014); and see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) - (3) (West 2013). 
43
 Id. 
44
 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/wyskapr.html#CashBalancePlan (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (The cash 
balance plan includes some elements of a Defined Contribution Plan but is categorized as a Defined Benefit Plan).  
45
 Chad Baruch, The Widening Gyre: The Illusory Promise of Meaningful Judicial Review of ERISA Benefit Denials 
in the Fifth Circuit, 25 S.U. L. REV. 99, 100 (1997).  
46
 Id. 
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plan benefits, and the trustee invests the plan’s funds.47  The plan participant or beneficiary is the 
eligible individual who can assert rights to benefits under the plan.
48
  
Moreover, three different federal statutes, vested within three different federal 
departments are bestowed with enforcement responsibilities. Namely, the Welfare and Pension 
Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA),
49
  the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
50
 and 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC)
51
  serve an enforcement function. The judiciary, however, 
serves as the only institution, currently, able to engage all aspects of ERISA’s labyrinth-like 
provisions.  
The WPPDA regulates private pension systems for purposes of protecting plan 
participants’ rights and benefits.52  Unfortunately, the WPPDA’s scope is limited to disclosure 
requirements and lacks substantive fiduciary standards.
53
  The WPPTDA’s main inadequacy is 
found in its reliance upon the employee’s initiative to police and manage his own plan.54  
Moreover, the LMRA provides guidelines to establish and administer jointly operated employer 
and union plans.
55
  But, the LMRA does not establish nor provide standards for preserving 
vested benefits, funding adequacy, investment security, or fiduciary conduct.
56
  Further, the IRC 
sets rules for a plan to attain “qualified status.”57  Such qualified status grants deductions to the 
                                                          
47
 Id. 
48
 Id.  
49
 See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1031 (2013). 
50
 See 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 141-187 (2013). 
51
 See I.R.C. § 401 (2013). 
52
 See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1031 (2013). 
53
 See History of EBSA and ERISA, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2014). 
54
 Robert G. Blakey, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, PAPER 173 SCHOLARLY 
WORKS (1963). available at. http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/173. 
55
 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 185, 141-197 (2013). 
56
 MEDILL, supra note 5, at § 9.  
57
 I.R.C. § 401 (2013). 
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employer when the employer accrues a benefit for the employee.
58
  As the IRC’s essential 
function is to prevent evasion of tax obligations and generate revenue, the safeguards set by IRC 
to protect pension are limited.
59
  Therefore, the IRC’s limited power includes granting or 
disallowing qualified status; i.e. the availability of a tax advantage and subsequent tax 
consequence.
60
  
Lastly, ERISA allows civil enforcements of its provisions.
61
  ERISA sets forth several 
claims from which civil litigation and civil enforcement actions may arise.
62
  A plan participant 
or beneficiary may bring a claim to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan or to clarify 
rights for future benefits under the plan.
63
  Typically, in a denial of benefits claim, a civil action 
is brought after the plan’s administrator has denied a claim for benefits and the participant or 
beneficiary has exhausted the plan’s administrative appeal procedure.64 
3. Trust Law in ERISA 
At ERISA’s inception, ERISA’s complex scheme required adoption of other areas of law 
to fill in gaps.  Congress referred to trust law for guidance in forming remedial provisions and 
the standards by which courts now review such provisions.  Referring to trust law as a guide to 
inform ERISA, courts have created remedial regimes by utilizing trust law as the default 
structure.
65
  Consequently, courts have continuously resorted to a presumptive dependence on 
                                                          
58
 Id. 
59
 MEDILL, supra note 5, at §9.  
60
 Id. 
61
 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a) (2013). 
62
 Id. 
63
 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2013). 
64
 See 29 U.S.C.S. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2013).  
65
 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008), Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc., 220 F.3d at 702 (6th Cir. 
2000), Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3rd Cir. 1995), Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013), 
and John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
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trust principles even though Congress used trust principles as a temporary guide.
66
  Namely, 
several courts have recognized that “[c]ommon law trust principles animate [, but do not 
control,] the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA.”67  Congress, in enacting ERISA, 
referred to trust law for regulatory purposes, to inhibit employer autonomy over employee 
benefit plans, thus restricting plan fiduciary and trustee’s powers to alter the standard of review 
with self-serving language.
68
 Altogether, while trust principles continue to influence courts, 
ERISA’s remedial scheme ultimately controls an ERISA analysis and not trust law. 
Often, common law trust principles have been the starting point for courts when 
analyzing ERISA plan interpretation claims.
69
  Many ERISA fiduciary duty provisions import 
fiduciary trust principles.
70
  Congress, while forming a foundation from which courts could look 
to, did not propound an exact transposition of common law trust principles into ERISA.
71
  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that “trust law does not tell the entire story. 
After all, ERISA's standards and procedural protections partly reflect a congressional 
determination that the common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection.”72  
While “ERISA abounds with language and terminology of trust law,” a proliferation of trust law 
                                                          
66
 Id. 
67
 Acosta v. Pacific Enter., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991). See Cent. States v. Cent. Transp., 472 U.S. 559, 570-
71 (1985). 
68
 John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit 
Denials under ERISA, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1315, 1317 (2007). 
69
 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); and see S.REP. NO. 127, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess., at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4865; H.R.REP. NO. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649.  
70
 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000); S.REP. NO. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4865; H.R.REP. NO. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4639, 4649. 
71
 See John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary Investing Under ERISA, in Proxy Voting of Pension Plan 
Equity Securities, in WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE U. OF PENNSYLVANIA: PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL 128 (Dan M. 
McGill ed., 1989); See also Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The 
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105 (1988). 
72
 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). 
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terminology does not mean that trust law is the only or best solution whenever a court tackles an 
ERISA plan interpretation question.
73
  Hence, ERISA was enacted as a regulatory regime while 
absorbing common law trust principles to guide and not to dominate ERISA’s purpose.74  ERISA 
may and should alter adopted trust principles when necessary.
75
 
ERISA fiduciary laws are uniquely premised on ERISA’s purpose to protect plan 
participants and promote plan creation, which are different from conventional trust law.
76
  
ERISA fiduciary duties govern plan administration as well as plan interpretation.
77
  Trust law 
presumes that trustees are disinterested and generally are without a personal stake in trust assets, 
while ERISA fiduciaries are employed and sometimes aligned with the employer or insurance 
company supplying the insurance benefit.
78
  The legislative safeguard arises from ERISA’s 
language, which demands plan fiduciaries to act "solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries . . . ."
79
  But, as a cost-effectiveness measure to promote the creation of plans, 
ERISA authorizes employers to use “an officer, employee, agent or other representative” as 
fiduciaries, thus creating an inherent conflict between trust law principles and the practical 
dynamics of fiduciary plan interpretation.
80
   
                                                          
73
 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (1989). 
74
 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083 (Conference Committee 
Report explaining that when interpreting fiduciary standards the purpose of ERISA must control). 
75
 Id.  
76
 LANGBEIN, supra note 68, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1315 at §1326.   
77
 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000) (Plan administration – administration of plan assets and plan interpretation 
may include interpretation of benefits claim. Granting or denying claimed plan benefits entails the exercise of 
"discretionary authority" within the meaning of ERISA § 3(21)(A) or 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000)). 
78
 LANGBEIN, supra note 68, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1315 at §1326. 
79
 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000). 
80
 29 U.S.C. § 1108 (2000). See ERISA §§3(16), 402(a), or 29 U.S.C. §§1002(16), 1102(a) (2000) (which make the 
employer the default plan administrator); and see ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000) (which 
makes plan administration a fiduciary function). 
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A plan administrators is bound by ERISA to act in the sole benefit of the plan participants 
and beneficiary, but the plan administrator is paid, hired, or fired by the employer.  The conflict 
is apparent.  Trust scholars have noted that an employer or insurance company cannot act 
unbiasly on behalf of himself and in the interest of the trust beneficiary.
 81
  The Supreme Court 
has distinguished the inherent conflict between a plan administrator’s duty to act in the sole 
benefit of plan participants while being paid by the employer by citing to ERISA’s special nature 
and the careful balance needed to promote plan creation.
82
  Specifically, the Supreme Court has 
stated that an “[e]mployer[], for example, can be [an] ERISA fiduciar[y] and still take actions to 
the disadvantage of employee beneficiaries, when they act as employers . . . .”83 Thus, Supreme 
Court reduces liability under one conflict, where the plan participant is paid by the employer and 
acting in the sole interest of the plan and its participants, in order to promote the creation of 
plans.
84
  
Furthermore, trust law principles have been adopted for regulatory purposes in other 
fields aside from ERISA.
85
  Congress has not fully transplanted trust law principles into other 
fields without regard to the purpose of such area of law.
86
  Accordingly, trust law principles 
naturally are modified, when applicable, to conform to ERISA’s purpose.  It follows, then, that 
                                                          
81
 GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, Bogert’s Trust and Trustees, in The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 
543, at 227 (rev. 2d ed. 1993). 
82
 LANGBEIN, supra note 68, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1315 at §1326; Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. 
85
 See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust As an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 
174-77 (1997) (A discussion on a variety of regulatory compliance trusts in federal and state law). 
86
 Id. 
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trust principles should be modified to determine when the arbitrary and capricious standard 
should apply, as identified by the Supreme Court.
87
   
4. Arbitrary and Capricious: As Applied to ERISA 
The arbitrary and capricious standard derives from pre-ERISA denial of benefits claims 
under LMRA.
88
  Arbitrary and capricious was the prevailing standard of review of trustee 
responsibility when ERISA was enacted.
89
  Prior to ERISA’s enactment, the LMRA served as a 
regulator of union-negotiated pension trust administration.
90
  The LMRA did not expressly 
authorize suits brought against individual trustees and fiduciaries.
91
  For instance, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard was applied to review whether a plan provision was structurally 
defective, which lead to a denial of benefits, and not the misconduct of the individual 
administrator.
92
  
The arbitrary and capricious standard has evolved from its original adoption.
93
  ERISA, 
while a comprehensive statute, does not specify a standard of review for a court to adopt when 
analyzing a plan administrator or trustee’s actions.94  As a result, federal common law has 
evolved numerous legal principles to resolve ambiguities in ERISA’s provisions.95  Thus, federal 
courts by analogy imported the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard of review into ERISA’s 
                                                          
87
 See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989); and see Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 
(2010). 
88
 Kevin W. Beatty, A Decade Confusion: The Standard of Review for Erisa Benefit Denial Claims as Established 
by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 734-36 (2000).  
89
 Id. 
90
 Bradley R. Duncan, Litigation Under ERISA: Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA: An 
Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 986, 992 (1986). 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. at 993. 
93
 See Rud v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 438 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006) (sliding scale approach); and see Van Boxel v. 
Journal Co. Emps.’ Pension Trust., 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987). 
94
 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) (2012). 
95
 See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 US 101 (1989), Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 
(2008), and see Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010). 
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standards.
96
  With the adoption of ERISA, Congress included provisions that imposed similar 
fiduciary duties to those under the LMRA. At the time of ERISA’s adoption, however, one key 
difference set ERISA and LMRA duties and subsequent standard of review apart.
97
  While 
LMRA focuses on the structural defect of plan provisions in union-negotiated plan, ERISA 
focuses on securing plans “for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees,” and thus allow 
individual review of plan administrators’ actions.98  
As a result of filling ERISA gaps with trust principles, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard broadens the protective scope of plan administrator acting under a conflict of interest.
99
  
For example, trust principles under a traditional trust operate in the interest of the trust, generally 
without a conflict. Conversely, under an ERISA plan, the employer usually employs the trust 
administrator, who gets paid by the employer but must act in the interest of the plan participants 
and beneficiaries, creating an inherit conflict of interest. While such conflict is inherit, the 
Supreme Court, in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 US 101 (1989), instead of 
finding that a conflict of interest automatically amounts to an arbitrary and capricious act,
100
 
accorded great deference to plan administrators based on trust principles, if the plan accorded 
                                                          
96
 Michael S. Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits-Denial Cases after Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch: Revolution or Deja vu?, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 2 (1990). E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 
489 U.S. 101, 108-09 (1989) (“ERISA does not set out the appropriate standard of review for action under § 
1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility determinations. To fill this gap, federal courts have adopted the 
arbitrary and capricious standard developed under . . . 29 USC § 186(c), a provision of the Labor Management  
Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA).”). 
97
 DUNCAN, supra note 88, § 994. 
98
 Id. 
99
 E.g. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emps.’ Pension Trust., 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987) (Adopting a sliding 
scale approach that "may be in effect a sliding scale of judicial review of [a] trustees' decisions [-] more 
penetrating the greater is the suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is."). 
100
 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 145; See Kevin W. Beatty, A Decade Confusion: The Standard of Review for Erisa Benefit 
Denial Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 ALA. L. REV. 733, 733-36 (2000) (Firestone did not follow the 
sliding scale approach in Van Boxel. Van Boxel’s sliding scale approach created an analysis that "may be in effect 
a sliding scale of judicial review of [a] trustees' decisions [-] more penetrating the greater is the suspicion of 
partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is." While a conflicted trustee may receive deference under a 
Firestone approach, a de novo review is the recommended standard for conflicting administrative decisions.). 
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such deference upon the plan administrator.
101
 Specifically, Firestone referred to the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts to confer discretion upon a trustee and his exercise of power.
102
 Trust 
principles provide that a trustee’s exercise of power is not subject to a court’s control, unless to 
prevent an abuse of discretion.
103
  Thus, fusing trust principles and the arbitrary and capricious 
standard protects a conflict of interest from automatically amounting to an abuse of discretion; 
the arbitrary and capricious standard, however, does not protect conflict that amount to an abuse 
of discretion.
104
    
Scholars have criticized the importation of the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard 
of review as applied to ERISA.
105
 The LMRA legislation provides safeguards that, for example, 
require submission of dispute in plan interpretation to an independent arbiter, which ERISA does 
not have.
106
 Thus, scholars have questioned the rationale behind applying a lenient standard of 
review to an administrator’s actions when no inherent safeguards are in place.107  
With its origins in trust law, the arbitrary and capricious standard has left many unsettled 
issues for courts to address. Even though the Supreme Court has already resolved some of the 
issues concerning the application of this standard as applied to plan interpretation by trustees, it 
has created even more questions, which scholars have identified as critical to resolving the 
practical implications upon promoting plan creation and protecting plan participants. 
                                                          
101
 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111-13. 
102
 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112-13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (2013). 
103
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (2013); See generally Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 
F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990) (Scholars and the courts alike have used abuse of discretion and arbitrary and 
capricious interchangeably when referring to a deferential standard of review in ERISA cases.). 
104
 A conflict that arises solely from having an employee trustee administrate the plan does not amount to an abuse 
of discretion.   
105
 BEATTY, supra note 86, §§734-36. 
106
 Id. at 736. 
107
 Id. at 734-36. 
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II. ERISA’s Federal Common Law: The Supreme Court Sets Contours for Judicial 
Review 
 
ERISA, as interpreted by the courts, has imposed several limitations on plan participants 
and beneficiaries by finding justification in creating uniform sets of laws that encourage 
employers to establish or sponsor employee benefit plans.
108
  The Supreme Court has followed a 
simplistic approach in fixing an employer-favoring standard of review.  In the past twenty years, 
the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of judicial review in the ERISA context.
109
  The 
following section highlights each Supreme Court case and its analysis in fashioning an 
employer-favoring standard of review.  
1. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch (1989) 
 
Before 1989, ERISA failed to establish standard of review for denial of benefits 
claims.
110
  In 1989, the Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, the issue of ERISA plan 
interpretation and established the de novo standard of review as the default standard of judicial 
review in denial of benefit claims.
111
  The Supreme Court decided the following two issues in 
Firestone: 1) the standard of judicial review warranted in appraising ERISA denial of benefits 
claims and 2) the meaning of the word “participant” in order to determine who can request plan 
information.
112
  Focusing on the first of two issues, Firestone held that “[c]onsistent with 
established principles of trust law, . . . a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to 
be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the 
                                                          
108
 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004). 
109
 See Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 US 101 (1989), Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 
(2008), and see Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010). 
110
 Firestone, 489 US at 111. 
111
 Id. at 108 (Firestone involved a denial of severance benefits under a termination pay plan governed by ERISA.). 
112
 Id. at 105, 108. 
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plan.”113  Thus, Firestone is the starting point whenever analyzing an ERISA plan interpretation 
or judicial standard of review issue. 
The Firestone case was a class action by employees who sought severance benefits under 
one of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company’s ERISA qualified plans.114 The class action ensued 
because Firestone Tire and Rubber Company interpreted the plan language to deny the benefit 
claims, explaining that the reason for the claim did not in fact fall within the meaning of the plan, 
as they interpreted it.
115
  
The Court’s holding was expressly “limited to the appropriate standard of review in § 
1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan interpretations. Firestone 
expressed no view as to the appropriate standard of review for actions under other remedial 
provisions of ERISA.”116 The Court did not transplant principles of trust law, but was simply 
guided by trust law principles to decide a reviewing standard for a remedial provision of ERISA, 
not all remedial provisions of ERISA.
117
 Thus, applying an arbitrary and capricious standard did 
not mean that the plan administrator will prevail on the merits, but only that the plan 
administrator's interpretation of the plan “will not be disturbed if reasonable.”118 
Thus, Firestone was not primarily concerned with the possibility of reducing protections 
to plan participants and beneficiaries. The Court’s pronouncement provided employers and 
trustees a means of defeating the heightened de novo standard of review.
119
 The Court justified 
the adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to trustees who act under the 
provisions of plan terms granting discretion by resting its analysis on general principles of trust 
                                                          
113
 Id. at 111 (emphasis added). 
114
 Id. at 108. 
115
 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 106. 
116
 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added). 
117
 Id. 
118
 Id. at 108-09. 
119
 Id. at 113-14. 
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law.
120
 The Court’s adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review was based on the 
premise that ERISA was like any other contract, where deference is given to either party’s 
interpretation unless the contract itself redirects such deference to one party.
121
 
2. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn (2008) 
In 2008, the Supreme Court in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008), 
followed Firestone’s adoption of a highly deferential standard of review - arbitrary and 
capricious standard, where a plan grants discretionary authority upon the plan administrator.
122
 
Glenn also added to Firestone’s framework by requiring the consideration of external factors, 
such as the severity of a conflict of interest, when deciding whether an administrator’s acts were 
arbitrary and capricious.
123
 The Glenn Court stated that some factors merits consideration even 
under a deferential standard of review.
124
 Glenn was not a broader application of Firestone’s 
judicial review principles, but an application of Firestone’s underlying trust law principles in an 
effort to promote plan participants and beneficiaries’ rights under a deferential standard of 
review in benefit denial cases. 
In Glenn, the petitioner served as an administrator and insurer of an ERISA-governed 
long-term disability insurance plan.
125
  The petitioner as administrator had discretionary 
authority to determine employee’s benefit claims and, as an insurer, funded payments for 
approved benefit claims.
126
 An employee and plan participant, with a governmentally approved 
                                                          
120
 Id. at 115. 
121
 BARUCH, supra note 45, at §112. 
122
 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 109 (2008). 
123
 Id. 
124
 Id. 
125
 Id. at 108. 
126
 Id. 
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disability, was denied plan disability benefits.
127
 Even though the Social Security Administration 
granted her permanent disability, the administrator denied her claim for plan disability payments 
because the standard enumerated by the plan was stricter than the Social Security 
Administration’s definition.128 
The Court determined two issues: 1) whether a conflict of interest exists when a plan 
administrator both evaluates a benefits claim and pays for such claim; and 2) whether any such 
conflict of interest influences the “judicial review of a discretionary benefit determination.”129 
Glenn held that a conflict of interest may exist when the plan is responsible for both determining 
whether a valid benefit claims exist and paying the claim.
130
 The Court identified “that this dual 
role creates a conflict of interest. . . [and that] conflicts are but one factor among many that a 
reviewing judge must take into account.”131 
The Court did not want to forsake Firestone.
132
 No change, but an addition, to the 
deferential standard of review was made.
133
  Trust law was, again, the fundamental premise for 
keeping to high deference.
134
  Glenn, while citing to the Restatement of Trusts, reasoned that a 
conflicted trustee’s claim determination does not switch the standard back to de novo review, but 
required that a reviewing judge take “account of the conflict when evaluating [] whether [a] 
trustee, subjectively or procedurally, has abused his discretion.” 135  Specifically, a conflict may 
exists, but a court will consider the extent of that conflict as one factor in determining whether 
the trustee abused his discretion.  While dependent of the facts, a conflict of interest, generally, 
                                                          
127
 Id. at 109. 
128
 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 109. 
129
 Id. at 110. 
130
 Id. at 108, 116. 
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 Id. at 116. 
133
 Id. at 115. 
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 Glenn, 554 U.S. at 115. 
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alone, does not automatically revert judicial scrutiny back to the de novo standard of review.
136
  
Even when a conflict of interest is present, a deferential standard is warranted when the plan 
grants discretion upon the trustee. 
In addition, other factors may be considered to determine whether a trustee has abused 
his discretion.
137
 While a conflict of interest was considered one factor, it was not the only one 
the court would consider.
138
 Analogizing to administrative law judges, who take account of case-
specific factors to determine liability, Glenn appoints judges with the ultimate task of weighing 
all factors together.
139
 
Adding procedural rules to combat inadequacies in internal plan review of benefits 
denials was not an option for the Court due to a concern of added complexity, time, and expense 
on the court system and plan participants.
140
  The Court emphasized that “[b]enefits decisions 
arise in too many contexts, concern too many circumstances, and can relate in too many different 
ways to conflicts . . . for us to come up with a one-size-fits-all procedural system that is likely to 
promote fair and accurate review.”141 The Court further reasoned that Congress did not intend for 
the court to review the “lion’s share of ERISA plan claims denials . . . [for if] Congress intended 
such a system of review, . . . it would not have left to the courts the development of review 
standards but would have said more on the subject.”142  
Thus, Glenn creates a method for courts to decide, after considering external factors, 
whether a judicial standard of review should revert back to de novo when the plan enumerates 
discretionary authority upon the trustee. Altogether, after Glenn, a court is navigated into 
                                                          
136
 Id. at 116-117 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
137
 Id. at 117. 
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considering numerous factors, such as a conflict of interest, when deciding whether a plan 
administrator’s actions are arbitrary and capricious. Glenn did not, however, enumerate the other 
numerous factors it approves for consideration. Nonetheless, the implications of such judicial 
navigation results in an amplified investigation of the facts in any given ERISA case that grants 
discretion upon the plan administrator. Therefore, instead of narrowly focusing on the four 
corners of the document, a court may widen its evidentiary horizon, which increases the 
possibility of finding that a plan administrator’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. 
3. Conkright v. Frommert (2010) 
In 2010, the Supreme Court, in Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506 (2010), addressed 
two issues: 1) whether a plan administrator’s second decision warranted deference after the first 
decision was considered unreasonable in the denial of benefits context; and 2) how to account for 
respondent’s past distribution in calculating current benefits to avoid paying the same benefit 
twice.
143
 Conkright held that a single honest mistake in ERISA plan administration did not 
warrant a stricter standard of review.
144
  In other words, a single honest mistake, alone, does not 
warrant a de novo review when the plan grants discretionary authority up the plan 
administrator.
145
 
Conkright follows Firestone’s pronouncement of trust law as a guide to answer the 
ERISA standard of review questions.
146
  The Court announced, from integrating Firestone and 
Glenn, four elements to determine the proper standard of review in future ERISA judicial review 
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 Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2010). 
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146
 Id. at 512. 
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cases.
147
 Namely, future courts would consider trust law, the plan’s terms at issue, ERISA’s 
purposes and principles, and the Firestone precedent.
148
  
The facts of Conkright entailed a corporation’s employees who left the corporation and 
received a lump-sum retirement benefit distribution, and then were later rehired.
149
 The plan 
administrators used a “phantom accounting” method to eliminate double retirement payments.150 
The plan administrator then proposed another accounting method that did not calculate the 
present value of past distributions but used a fixed interest rate from the time of the distribution 
that accounted for the time value of money.
151
  A class of employees filed suit after being denied 
benefits arising from the change in calculating methods.
152
  The Conkright Court recognized that 
the plan administrator’s initial choice in an inherently restrictive accounting method to the 
detriment of the plan participants was unreasonable.
153
 But the administrator’s decision was 
nonetheless labeled as an “honest mistake.”154 The Conkright Court reasoned, referring to its 
pronouncement in Glenn, that ERISA disfavors rules that create further complexity.
155
  The 
Court ultimately held that if a conflict of interest would “not strip a plan administrator of 
deference, it is difficult to see why a single honest mistake would require a different result.”156 
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148
 Id. 
149
 Conkright, 559 U.S. at 512. 
150
 Id. at 510. 
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On remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit District Court held that the plan 
administrator’s honest mistake was reasonable and thus not arbitrary and capricious.157 The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision after applying Firestone 
deference and explained that the plan administrator’s plan interpretation, while labeled an honest 
mistake was unreasonable and thus arbitrary and capricious because the administrator’s plan 
interpretation was inconsistent with the plan language.
158
 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
further noted that even under a de novo review the plan administrator’s honest mistake was 
unreasonable and thus arbitrary and capricious because it violated another ERISA provision.
159
 
Therefore, while an honest mistake does not strip an administrator of his Firestone deference, if 
such mistake is unreasonable, either through violating another ERISA provision or an irrational 
plan interpretation, the administrator’s act will be considered arbitrary and capricious.   
 
 
i. Breyer’s Dissent and Accompanying Scholars 
 
Justice Breyer, dissenting in Conkright, accepted Firestone’s validity but was concerned 
with the majorities’ unprecedented and erroneous conclusion of interpreting trust law in such an 
inflexible manner.
160
  Justice Breyer highlighted that the majority recognized trust law did “not 
resolve the specific issue before the Court.”161 Nonetheless, while having the opportunity to 
reference another body of law or to interpret trust law in such a manner to promote plan 
                                                          
157
 Paul Mollica, Frommert v. Conkright, No. 12-67 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2013), DAILY DEVELOPMENTS IN EEO LAW, 
(Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.employmentlawblog.info/2013/12/frommert-v-conkright-no-12-67-2d-cir-dec-23-
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participants’ and beneficiaries’ interest, the Court fashioned a rule that required deference to a 
plan administrator’s second attempt at interpreting plan documents when he was found to have 
abused his discretion the first time he interpreted plan documents.
162
 
Consistent with Justice Breyer’s intuition and reasoning, scholars have noted that 
Conkright, while claiming to base its decision on trust principles, failed to consider fundamental 
trust principles inconsistent with the Conkright holding.
163
 Trust law requires the divestment of 
deference to a trustee when discretion is not exercised honestly and without bias.
164
 A trustee 
may exercise his discretion with bias by making multiple erroneous interpretations, even if in 
good faith.
165
 Not only bad faith, but also a plan administrator’s incompetence, can serve as 
sufficient reason to divest him of deference under trust principles.
166
  
Conkright reasons that ERISA’s purpose far outweighs the addition of further complexity 
to protect plan participants because a careful balance must be maintained to protect and preserve 
the reasons on which ERISA is based – in part, the enlargement and protection of plan 
participants’ and beneficiaries’ rights.167  Building on principles to promote the interest of 
efficiency, uniformity, and reduced litigation cost, while noting the careful balance courts have 
striven to strike between ensuring unbiased and prompt enforcement of rights and the 
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 Id. at 528-29. 
163
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encouragement of creating plans, the Court, however, justifies its pronouncement of broad 
deference to administrators on one side of the balance – promoting efficiency, predictability, and 
uniformity.
168
 
ii. The Split 
Since Firestone, the Ninth, Third, Sixth, and Second Circuits have disagreed on the extent 
to which the arbitrary and capricious standard applies to plan interpretation outside of the denial 
of benefits context.
169
  On opposite sides of the Firestone spectrum sits Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 
711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013), of the Ninth Circuit and John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan 
v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360 (2nd Cir. 1994), of the Second Circuit.  John Blair adopts a 
strict reading of Firestone and applies the arbitrary and capricious standard to denial of benefits 
claims only.
170
  At the opposite end, Tibble proposes an arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review for all remedial ERISA provisions and any other plan interpretation provisions.
171
  The 
Third and Sixth Circuits have agreed that an arbitrary and capricious standard should apply 
outside of the denial of benefits context, but have not taken neither the Ninth Circuit nor Second 
Circuit’s extreme position.172  The Third and Sixth Circuits do not define how far the arbitrary 
and capricious standard should apply outside of the denial of benefits context.
173
  Thus, broadly 
categorized, the Ninth and Second Circuits sits at opposite sides while the Sixth and Third 
Circuits sit somewhere in between the Ninth and Second Circuits. 
                                                          
168
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1. One Side of the Split is Strict Construction: The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
does not Apply to All Plan Interpretation Claims Outside of the Denial of Benefits 
Context.  
i. Second Circuit - John Blair Commc’n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group 
(1994) and Frommert v. Conkright (2nd Cir. 2013). 
 
The Second Circuit, in John Blair, decided whether the arbitrary and capricious standard 
applies outside of the denial of benefits context.
174
  The court held that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard does not apply outside the benefits denial context.
175
 It is important to note, 
however, that John Blair was the first case decided after Firestone that faithfully followed 
Firestone’s limited standing. Since Firestone, the Second Circuit has continued to uphold John 
Blair’s legacy, while the Supreme Court has decided two cases speaking, in part, to judicial 
standard of review in ERISA claims on plan interpretation.
176
 
John Blair involved a suit by the John Blair company plan (JBCP) and its members 
against another plan, the Telemundo plan (TP), as a committee and individual members of the 
committee.
177
 The JBCP was reorganized to include new members and funds from another 
plan.
178
 The process entailed transferring assets from a plan that was reorganized into the 
JBCP.
179
 During the re-organization of the JBCP, TP transferred assets from the reorganized plan 
into JBCP but failed to transfer the appreciation of those assets.
180
 As a result, JBCP claimed that 
TP violated its fiduciary duty. 
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In declining to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard outside of the denial of 
benefits context, John Blair kept to Firestone’s pronouncement – the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, in Firestone, only applied to the denial of benefits context.
181
 The Second Circuit 
strictly construed Firestone’s holding.182  John Blair justified its narrow interpretation of 
Firestone on the same idea identified by the Moench court – that all ERISA remedial actions are 
not the same and as such all ERISA remedial actions should not utilize the same standard of 
judicial review.
183
 In addition, John Blair justifies its holding by identifying that Firestone 
concerned a denial of benefits case and did not speak to other ERISA remedial actions where the 
plan grants interpretative powers upon the plan administrator.
184
  
Moreover, the Second Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, in Frommert v. 
Conkright, 738 F.3d 522 (2nd Cir. 2013), continues to uphold the John Blair legacy.
185
 In 
Frommert, on appeal, the plaintiffs brought two claims: that the plan administrator plan 
interpretation 1) was an unreasonable interpretation under a denial of benefits claim, and 2) 
violated an ERISA notice provision.
186
 Frommert explicitly declined to address what standard of 
review applied outside the denial of benefits context. Specifically, the court stated that 
determining whether an ERISA notice violation stemming from an “interpretation of the [plan] . . 
. , is subject to review under a de novo or abuse of discretion standard. We decline to answer that 
question here . . . .”187 The Frommert decision recaptures the Second Circuit’s stance on 
determining the standard of review for plan interpretation that are beyond the denial of benefits 
context.  In conclusion, John Blair and Frommert stand for the proposition that Firestone 
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deference applies to denial of benefit claims and any other claim outside of the denial of benefits 
context requires review from another court to determine the appropriate standard of review.
188
  
2. The Other Side of the Split is Liberal Construction: The Arbitrary and Capricious 
Standard Applies Outside of the Denial of Benefits Context. 
i. Ninth Circuit - Tibble v. Edison Int’l (2013) 
 The Ninth Circuit, in Tibble, decided whether the arbitrary and capricious standard 
should apply to a plan administrator or trustee’s plan interpretation outside of the benefit claims 
context.
189
  Broadly interpreting Firestone and its progeny, Tibble held that a high deferential 
standard of review applied to all plan interpretations beyond denial of benefit claims.
190
 Under 
such analysis, the Tibble court applied Firestone deference in evaluating a plan administrator’s 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
191
 
 The facts of Tibble entailed a suit by beneficiaries against the employer’s benefit plan 
administrator for allegedly managing the plan imprudently in a self-interested fashion.
192
 The 
employer provided six investment options in the defined contribution plan,
193
 which entitled 
retirees only to the value of their own investment accounts.
194
 Among the other financial options 
to choose from, the company had retail-class mutual funds, which had higher administrative fees 
than alternatives available only to institutional investors.
195
 Further, the addition of a wider array 
of mutual funds also introduced a practice known as revenue sharing into the mix.
196
 Under this 
                                                          
188
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dynamic, certain mutual funds collected fees out of fund assets and disbursed them to the plan’s 
service provider.
197
 The employer, Edison, in turn received a credit on its invoices from that 
provider.
198
  Beneficiaries objected to the inclusion of retail-class mutual funds, specifically 
claiming that their inclusion had been imprudent, and that the practice of revenue sharing had 
violated both the plan document and conflict of interest provision.
199
  The beneficiaries also 
claimed that offering unitized stock funds, money market-style investments, and mutual funds 
had been imprudent.
200
 
The plan document stated that the administrative cost would be paid by the company.
201
  
By providing more investment options to the beneficiaries, the plan became more expensive to 
administer and Edison availed itself of revenue sharing with the third party administrator of 
investment options for the plan.
202
 Under the agreement, the mutual fund would transfer a 
portion of their fees to the plan’s third party service provider’s account.203 The revenue would 
reimburse the third party service provider, thus Edison would receive a credit on its bill from the 
third party servicer.
204
 The plan was later amended to include discretionary authority to interpret 
the plan’s language, and the Tibble court addressed the interpretive issues of whether the pre-
amendment version of the plan allowed offsets or revenue sharing.
205
  
 Tibble found three main reasons for holding that Firestone deference applies beyond plan 
interpretation in benefit denial claims and to fiduciary duties.
206
 In identifying and distinguishing 
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the current split on the scope of deferential review, first, the Tibble court distinguished John 
Blair, which holds that Firestone deference is generally limited to denial of benefit claims.
207
  
Next, Tibble reasoned that trust law dictates the appropriate standard of review.
208
 Lastly, Tibble 
reasons that its “across-the-board” deference derives from Conkright’s emphasis on promoting 
plan creation.
209
 
Tibble identified strong parallels between Conkright and John Blair.
210
 The Conkright 
decision arose from the Second Circuit, from which the decision in John Blair originated. While 
the Conkright court did not expressly repudiate John Blair’s holding, it nonetheless reasoned that 
exceptions to ERISA were disfavored. Conkright repudiated the Second Circuit’s exception to 
Firestone deference by forgiving a first-time good-faith mistake by a plan administrator or 
trustee. Therefore, Tibble reasoned that anything resembling a carved-out exception to ERISA 
deferential review is unwarranted.
211
  
 Second, Tibble reasoned that trust law controls the analysis in deciding the standard of 
judicial review.
212
 While acknowledging that Firestone’s holding was limited to denial of benefit 
claims and no other ERISA remedial provisions, the Court noted trust law was a founding 
principle in Firestone.
213
  Thus, using trust principles, which Firestone found appropriate solely 
for its denial of benefit claims analysis, Tibble presumed that trust law is the appropriate body of 
law to control the standard of review for any and all plan interpretation concerning ERISA. 
214
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 Lastly, Tibble justified its “across-the-board” deference by identifying Conkright’s 
emphasis on the careful balance between promoting plan creation and protecting plan 
participant’s rights.215 Following the spirit of Conkright, Tibble was likewise more concerned 
with one side of the balance - promoting efficiency, predictability, and uniformity to encourage 
the creation of ERISA plans.
216
 Like Conkright, therefore, Tibble completely disregarded the 
equitable standards that ensure unbiased and prompt enforcement of plan participants’ and 
beneficiary rights – the other side of the balance.217  
ii. Sixth Circuit - Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc. (2000) 
The Sixth Circuit, in Hunter v. Caliber Sys. Inc., 220 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2000), decided 
whether the lower court erred by applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to a plan 
administrator plan interpretation outside of the denial of benefit claims context.
218
 Similar to 
Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3rd Cir. 1995), Hunter held that the application of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard applied beyond the typical review of denial of benefits 
claims.
219
 In holding that the district court did not err in using the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review, Hunter based its decision on Firestone and trust law principles.
220
 
Hunter involved a suit by plan participants who claimed that the plan administrator failed 
to perform several fiduciary duties.
221
 Plan participants were denied lump sum distributions and 
delayed the opportunity to sell company stock after a spin-off from defendant’s parent company 
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occurred.
222
 An amendment to the plan was made. Such amendment created a fiction that plan 
participants’ employment was continues during the spin-off of the parent and subsidiary 
company, when in-fact they were not.
223
 Summary judgment was affirmed in favor of the plan 
administrators under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
224
  
While acknowledging that the wholesale importation of trust principles into ERISA is 
unwarranted, Hunter announced that the arbitrary and capricious standard is appropriate outside 
the denial of benefits context.
225
 The Sixth Circuit added that its circuit precedent, as consistent 
with Firestone, required an inquiry of whether the plan administrator’s interpretation was 
arbitrary and capricious, made in bad faith, or otherwise contrary to law.
226
  Hunter recognized 
that Firestone stood for the limited premise that the standard of review for denial of benefit 
claims, and not any other remedial ERISA provision, is arbitrary and capricious when the plan 
grants discretion upon the trustee or plan administrator.
227
 Nonetheless, the Hunter court 
modeled its analysis after Firestone and Moench and based its decision to apply the arbitrary and 
capricious standard outside the benefits claims context on language and principles of trust law.
228
 
Hunter is different from Tibble’s expansive position because Hunter did not state the extent to 
which the arbitrary and capricious standard should apply outside the denial of benefits context.
229
 
Thus, Hunter stands for the proposition that the arbitrary and capricious standard should apply 
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outside of the denial of benefits context but exactly how far from the denial of benefits context is 
unclear.
230
  
iii. Third Circuit - Moench v. Robertson (1995) 
The Third Circuit, in Moench, considered to what extent fiduciaries of an Employee 
Stock Option Plan (ESOP) may be liable when investing solely in the employer’s common stock 
and when the plan terms provide that the primary purpose of the ESOP is to invest in employer’s 
stock.
231
 The subsidiary and accompanying issue was whether a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
warranted an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
232
 Moench held that while the arbitrary 
and capricious standard should not be mechanically applied to all ERISA claims, Firestone’s 
mode of analysis and reference to trust law warrants the application of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard in breach of fiduciary claims.
233
  
Moench involved a bank holding company that established an ESOP for its employees.
234
 
Throughout a three-year period, the bank’s common stock fell approximately 95%.235  Federal 
regulatory agencies expressed their concern at the banks financial stability, but the plan 
administrator continued to invest in the ESOP.
236
 The bank ultimately filed for bankruptcy.
237
 
Former bank employees who participated in the ESOP brought suit against the bank committee, 
while not suing the plan trustee nor the plan sponsor, who was the bank.
238
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Moench, as in Hunter and Tibble, recognized that Firestone’s holding was limited to the 
applicable standard of review under denial of benefits claims and not other remedial measures 
under ERISA.
239
 The Moench court justified its holding on Firestone’s dependence on trust 
principles.
240
 Firestone’s analysis, while limited to benefit claims, was pertinent to all claims 
challenging a fiduciaries performance under ERISA.
241
 Moench further explained that 
Congress’s intent to invoke trust law as a guide to ERISA is consistent with its decision because 
they do not pronounce that every remedial ERISA provision warrants an arbitrary and capricious 
review.
242
  
Therefore, the Moench court’s perspective was that denial of benefit claims, breach of 
fiduciary duty claims, and possibly other remedial claims, but not all ERISA remedial claims, 
warranted a deferential standard of review.
243
 While Tibble holds that the arbitrary and 
capricious standard applies without limits to any and all plan interpretation where the plan grants 
discretion, Moench hold that some but not all plan interpretation warrants an arbitrary and 
capricious standard.
244
 Moench suggests that certain facts, but not all facts, warrant an arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review where a plan grants discretion.
245
 The Moench court reasons 
that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review cannot simply apply to all ERISA remedial 
claims because each are comprised of dissimilar facts and circumstances that may require 
another standard of review.
246
 Thus, by inference, one can interpret Moench to mean that all 
ERISA remedial claims are not the same and those claims that are similar in fact and 
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circumstance, like a denial of benefit claim, warrant one type of standard for judicial review, but 
not one standard should apply to all ERISA remedial claims. 
iii. Analysis 
The inconsistency among the circuits create serious practical implications upon ERISA 
civil cases. The retirement pensions system, and how court’s interpret ERSIA, has an impact on 
1) how we save; 2) the fluctuation of our capital markets; and, among others 3) governmental 
responsibility through social security – fundamental elements of our nation’s financial security. 
The standard of judicial review and how courts evaluate whether a violation of an ERISA 
remedial provision has occurred implicates outcome determinative analysis. The Ninth Circuit 
has decided that any and all plan interpretation, beyond denial of benefits claims, should be 
accorded Firestone deference if the plan grants such.  
Plan interpretation includes a myriad of plan administrative duties with varying degrees 
of implications on the plan participant and beneficiary. For example, the area of plan 
interpretation includes: 1) denial of benefits claim; 2) the implementation of administrative rules 
to the plan and what can and cannot be added by the administrator; 3) determining what is 
adequate notice to plan participants;
247
 4) the scope of plan administrators’ fact determination in 
any such claim under the plan; 5) the scope of medical determinations; 6) determining who is a 
plan beneficiary when a state does not legally recognize same-sex marriage; 7) setting the scope 
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of fiduciary liability; 8) interpreting what formula will control the benefit calculation;
248
 and 9) 
interpreting benefit waivers.
249
  
ERISA explains that a court’s interpretation must carry out its purpose – to protect plan 
participants and beneficiaries and promote plan creation. This comment posits a possible solution 
to keep the careful balance between participant protection and plan promotion. While this 
comment agrees with one aspect of the Ninth Circuit - that all plan interpretation should be 
accorded Firestone deference if the plan provides discretion, this comment does not adopt the 
Second Circuit’s restrictive reading of Firestone. Instead, reflecting the current judicial trend in 
upholding deference for plan administrators when the plan grants discretion, this comment 
recommends that a court be required to adopt broader remedial safeguards by analyzing any and 
all relevant factors that may capture and demonstrate an arbitrary and capricious act. 
1. Weighing in on the Split 
 
The Sixth and Third Circuits’ holding reflects the model for added remedial safeguards 
that heighten the likelihood of finding an arbitrary and capricious act while sustaining the careful 
balance between plan creation and plan participant protection. The Second Circuit takes a strict 
constructionist approach refusing to expand the arbitrary and capricious standard reducing 
judicial economy. Lastly, the Ninth Circuit covers plan administrators with a protective veil 
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concerning any and all plan interpretation, so long the plan grants discretion, without regard to 
the rights and interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.
250
   
The Second Circuit has failed to recognize that an analytical skeleton is necessary to 
encompass other remedial provisions.
251
  By rigidly construing Firestone’s language to apply to 
the denial of benefits context only, the Second Circuit suggest that each and every plan 
interpretation provision in ERISA, if not already considered by the court, should be considered 
individually to determine what standard of review should apply.
252
 The court would be burdened 
if it had to consider all cases of plan interpretation individually and delineate a rule for each in 
deciding what standard of review applies. Such result would contradict ERISA’s purpose which 
seeks to add simplicity to the judicial avenues created by ERISA in an effort to promote plan 
creation. Thus, under the Second Circuit’s approach, courts would be flooded with the 
responsibility of deciding what standard of judicial review applies to each and every ERISA plan 
interpretation provision, thus increasing litigation and adding complexity to the administration of 
ERISA plans. 
The Second Circuit, however, does take a slightly practical approach to its analysis. In 
both John Blair and Formmert, the court found unsettling the idea that one standard of review 
would apply to any and all areas of plan interpretation within ERISA simply because the plan 
grants discretionary authority upon the plan administrator. John Blair and Formmert were 
concerned about the implications that approach would have upon plan participants and 
beneficiaries.  
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Additionally, the Second Circuit was concerned that discretionary language will covertly 
cover plan administrators’ action with the arbitrary and capricious standard from a court’s 
radar.
253
 Thus, the Second Circuit identifies a critical aspect of plan interpretation – that all areas 
of plan interpretation within ERISA are not the same, and thus should not implicate a default 
standard of review without a court’s approval.254  John Blair explained that several acts of plan 
interpretation implicates different fiduciary standards, thus warranting different levels of 
deference.
255
 Specifically, John Blair stated that in challenging a trustee in a denial of benefit 
context “the issue is not whether the trustees have sacrificed the interests of the beneficiaries as a 
class in favor of some third party's interests, but whether the trustees have correctly balanced the 
interests of present claimants against the interests of future claimants[,]” thus the circumstance 
dictates the appropriate level of discretion.
256
  
The Ninth Circuit, however, has taken a simplistic but dangerous approach.
257
 The Ninth 
Circuit suggest that the arbitrary and capricious standard should apply to all ERISA plan 
interpretation provisions. The Ninth Circuit, in Tibble, reasons that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard derives from trust principles, which has continuously served as the gap filler for ERISA, 
and hence justify its application to all ERISA plan interpretation provisions.
258
 But, maybe the 
Ninth Circuit should not kill the proverbial birds with one stone. 
Tibble’s across-the-board discretion to plan administrators and trustees leaves a number 
of new issues unanswered. Tibble grants deference to plan administrator and trustees on issues 
concerning plan interpretation. But, Tibble does not set out rules, standards, or parameters for 
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such fiduciaries’ interpretation. One is left with the proposition that a plan administrator has 
uninhibited interpretative discretion, if the plan grants some discretion, so long as such 
interpretation does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Given the expansive powers granted 
upon plan administrators interpreting the plan, Tibble did not adopt remedial safeguards in light 
of increasing trustees’ powers nor define what would amount to an abuse of discretion.  Tibble’s 
blanket discretion would now include issues that historically received a heightened standard of 
review.
259
 Tibble proposes that all plan interpretation claims must receive an arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review.
260
 The deferential standard of review would apply to health care 
plans, disability plans, accidental death plans, and certain provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.
261
  
While Tibble takes an across-the-board deference or a one-size-fits-all approach, ERISA 
does not. ERISA has different rules for different plans. For example, ERISA’s strict 
participation, vesting, and funding requirements apply to defined contribution and defined 
benefit plans, but does not apply to welfare benefit plans.
262
 Tibble, thus, has provided plan 
administrators with an unfettered powerful tool to pursue the unannounced but realistic 
practicalities of trust administration, like insurance – a dedicated unwillingness to payout claims.  
As a result, Tibble increases the strain between other limiting ERISA provisions and its 
across-the-board deference standard. Several ERISA provisions, as the enumeration of 
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Congress’s intent, limit plan sponsors or drafters from creating self-serving clauses.263 Thus, 
self-serving clauses that defeat Firestone’s nonderential review, a prerequisite to obtaining 
deferential review, arguably come in conflict with fiduciaries’ duties and ERISA’s purpose of 
promoting plan participant’s and beneficiaries’ interest. Hence, across-the-board deference fails 
to account for necessary remedial safeguards necessary to effectuate the balance sought by 
Congress. 
Moreover, the Sixth and Third Circuits hold that neither an across-the-board approach, as 
in the Ninth Circuit, or a strict reading of Firestone, as in the Second Circuit, controls the 
analysis to determine the standard of review when a plan grants discretion upon a trustee.
264
 The 
Sixth and Third Circuits fall in middle ground.
265
 They suggest that external factors warrant 
consideration, like the nature of the conflict of interest or whether a trustee’s act was in bad faith.  
The Sixth and Third Circuits do not identify a laundry list of factors, suggesting that the 
responsibility of identifying those factors are left to the reviewing court. They are simply silent 
on the issue of what factors warrant consideration but suggest that the consideration of external 
factors may be liberalized.  The Sixth and Third Circuits chose to consider whether a trustee’s 
actions were in bad faith or otherwise contrary to law in examining whether the trustee’s actions 
were arbitrary and capricious.  
The Sixth Circuit proscribed the wholesale importation of trust principles to all ERISA 
plan interpretation claims but accept that the arbitrary and capricious standard should be applied 
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outside the denial of benefits context.
266
 The Third Circuit followed, in Moench, by recognizing 
that "the arbitrary and capricious standard of review allowed in Firestone should not be applied 
mechanically to all ERISA claims."
267
 Essentially, the Third and Sixth Circuit’s concern was the 
issue of increased deference for plan administrators who were granted discretion by the plan and 
the lack of similar increased protections for plan participants and beneficiaries. Thus, the 
Moench and Hunter holdings hinted to remedial safeguards in reviewing a plan administrator’s 
actions; both courts considered factors such as bad faith or otherwise contrary to law to 
determine whether the administrator’s acts were arbitrary and capricious.  
Ultimately, The Second Circuit is well behind its time, while the Ninth Circuit is well 
ahead of its time without regard to beneficiary and plan participant rights and without adopting 
parallel remedial safeguard in light of aggrandizing administrator interpretative powers. The 
Sixth and Third Circuits have taken a step in the correct direction by considering external factors 
when determining whether a trustee’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. Thus, the Sixth and 
Third Circuits come closer to reaching a healthy balance – the promotion of employer sponsored 
ERISA plans and the protection of plan participants and beneficiaries.  
Therefore, the next step is to create an analytical framework that fit within the structure 
of Firestone’s progeny and that reflects the healthy balance of promoting plan creation and 
protecting plan participants through added remedial provision and factors. In order to resolve this 
problem and recalibrate the balance between plan creation and participant protection, if a court is 
to adopt an across-the-board deference approach, as propounded in Tibble, the adoption of 
remedial safeguards, in the form of accepting any and all factors that assist the court in finding 
an arbitrary and capricious act, are warranted. Specifically, in reviewing whether plan 
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interpretation was arbitrary and capricious, the court could, among others, consider 1) whether 
the plan administrator failed to account for factors necessary for an objective interpretation; 2) 
whether the plan administrator’s explanation for the denial is legitimate and founded upon a 
reasonable interpretation of the plan; 3) whether the interpretation has a rational connection with 
the facts influencing such interpretation; 4) whether previous interpretation of same provision 
under the same circumstance are consistent; or 5) whether external factors, like an employer’s 
business plan, influenced the administrator to interpret the plan differently, albeit objectively. 
2. Where the Supreme Court Missed its Mark 
ERISA was enacted to remedy defects in the private retirement system. Specifically, 
Congress explicitly sought to create and initiate the creation of adequate remedial safeguards 
with respect to administration and operation of ERISA plans.
268
 To fully comply with Congress’ 
intent, ERISA’s multifaceted and complex composition requires more than an across-the-board 
deference approach, as found in Tibble. While courts have recently landed on the side of 
simplicity,
269
 the imbalance between protecting individual pension rights and promoting the 
creation of private employer-sponsored retirement plans is not justified. The benefit of cloaking 
fiduciaries with across-the-board deference, without increasing procedural safeguards, is 
unfitting in light of Congressional intent and does not outweigh the anticipated cost. 
ERISA depends on the delicate balance between maintaining and promoting the creation 
of such plans through incentives and safeguards for plan sponsors and the protections afforded to 
plan participants and beneficiaries. Through enactments and amendments, Congress intended an 
equal balance to protect plan participants’ and beneficiaries’ interest. Yet, the Supreme Court’s 
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decisions add to the imbalance by continuing to make ERISA an employer-favoring statute.
270
 
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review has solidified an illusion of adequate remedial 
safeguards. In reality, the arbitrary and capricious standard cloaks fiduciaries and trustees with a 
delicate, though resilient, veil of indemnity creating a culture of lacking consequences for 
fiduciaries and trustees to the impactful detriment of plan participants and beneficiaries.  
First, the Firestone Court, failed to consider whether ERISA’s purpose would be better 
served by allowing plan drafters the ability to bypass the de novo standard.
271
 Scholars have 
noted that granting a plan drafter the ability to mold the plan to his sole interest contradicts 
Congress’ purpose to restrict private autonomy.272 Congress imposed trust principles to inhibit 
plan administrator’s unilateral decision making and to promote the plan participants’ and 
beneficiaries’ interest.273 Firestone made de novo review the default standard for reviewing a 
plan interpretation issue but did not consider whether plan construction that defeats de novo 
review is consistent with ERISA’s purpose and provisions.  
The practical consequence of Firestone and its progeny is evident in Tibble. In order to 
fall within the arbitrary and capricious standard, plan administrators or trustees simply need to 
amend plan language to prescribe discretion.
274
 Now, at least in the Ninth Circuit, plan 
administrators will be cloaked by the arbitrary and capricious standard without added checks and 
balances.
275
 The Ninth Circuit’s across-the-board approach, coupled with Conkright, may further 
encourage plan administrators to adopt unreasonable interpretations of plans initially, in 
anticipation that a second bite at the apple will ensue if their first interpretation is questioned or 
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held unreasonable.
276
 This, among other concerns, undermines the prompt resolution of disputes 
over benefits, driving up litigation cost or discourages employees from challenging a plan 
administrators’ decision all together.  
Next, Glenn did not want to forsake Firestone.
277
 No change, but an addition, to the 
deferential standard of review was made.
278
 Trust law was, again, the fundamental premise for 
keeping to high deference.
279
 Glenn, while citing to the Restatement of Trusts, reasoned that a 
conflicted trustee’s claim determination does not switch the standard back to de novo review.280 
The Court, however, required that a reviewing judge take “account of the conflict when 
evaluating determining whether the trustee, subjectively or procedurally, has abused his 
discretion.”281 Specifically, a conflict is but one factor in determining whether the trustee abused 
his discretion and does not automatically raise judicial scrutiny above the arbitrary and 
capricious standard.
282
  
Glenn failed to explicitly state what other factors may be considered to determine 
whether a trustee has abused his discretion.
283
 Glenn emphasized that “[b]enefits decisions arise 
in too many contexts, concern too many circumstances, and can relate in too many different 
ways to conflicts . . . for us to come up with a one-size-fits-all procedural system that is likely to 
promote fair and accurate review.”284 While the Court promoted the weighing of all the factors in 
examining a possible arbitrary and capricious act, it failed to require or structure what “all the 
factors” meant in for concerns of making adopting a bright line rule. Hence, one is left with the 
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following questions: 1) does “all of the factors” mean any and all factors that can help a court 
determine whether an arbitrary and capricious act exist; 2) should the court afford more weight 
to some factors over others; 3) does “all of the factors” mean that the judge can only consider 
those factors presented by counsel or can a judge consider other factors sua sponte; or 4) does 
“all of the factors” only mean the factors establishing the conflict of interest? Therefore, further 
clarity is needed to determine the breath of factors that may be considered by a reviewing judge.  
Furthermore, the Conkright Court continued to recognize the unclear state of trust law 
with regard to the question of trustee deference, but nonetheless faithfully followed the spirit of 
trust principles.
285
 The Conkright court solidified its faithfulness to trust law even when it 
recognized that the trust law was originally intended to serve only as a starting point, from which 
the court would then determine whether sufficient evidence supports departure from common 
trust law requirements.
286
 The Court explained that trust law warrants departure from common-
law trust deference “when reason indicates that the trustee will not exercise their discretion 
fairly, by showing, for example, that the trustee previously acted in bad faith.”287  One good-faith 
mistake does not divest the trustee of discretion.
288
 In effect, a good-faith mistake, like the 
conflict addressed in Glenn, must now be weighed as one factor in determining whether the 
trustee or plan administrator abused his discretion.  
Conkright explains that a conflict of interest alone does not amount to an arbitrary and 
capricious finding and neither does a single honest mistake alone. Conkright, however does not 
answer whether those two factors coupled together amount to an arbitrary and capricious finding; 
nor does Conkright explain what factors together or alone amount to an arbitrary and capricious 
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finding. While contrary and valid view is that most ERISA plan interpretation claims are fact-
sensitive, Conkright nonetheless fails to guide other courts in deciding what factors, beyond an 
honest mistake or conflict, should be afforded weight and considered.  
For these reasons, Firestone and its progeny leave many questions unanswered in light of 
the recent Ninth Circuit pronouncement in Tibble. In order to carry out ERISA’s purpose to 
protect plan participants and beneficiaries and promote plan creation, a solution must adopt 
ERISA’s overall purpose. The ideal solution keeps the balance at a horizontal equilibrium.  
3. A Proposed Solution 
 
This article asserts that the ideal arbitrary and capricious analysis identifies ERISA’s 
complexity to allow the consideration of any and all factors that may assist a judge in deciding 
whether an administrator’s plan interpretation is arbitrary and capricious. The consideration of 
any and all factors to assist an arbitrary and capricious determination does not contradict 
Firestone and its progeny’s standard. This essential approach warrants a method of review that 
will impose adequate remedial safeguards upon plan administrators and plan participants to 
uphold the careful balance Congress envisioned. As the judicial pendulum swings on the side of 
increased discretion for plan administrators, this article asserts that remedial safeguards for plan 
participants and beneficiaries have not likewise been increased by courts. 
This note proposes staying within the high-threshold arbitrary and capricious standard, as 
applied to all plan interpretation claims when the plan grants discretionary authority upon the 
administrator, while including remedial safeguards. Analogous to the analysis in Firestone, 
Glenn, and Conkright, an adapted importation of trust principles to the arbitrary and capricious 
standard would include the use of factors to increase the possibility of determining that an 
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administrator’s acts are arbitrary and capricious.289 The more factors one considers, the likelier 
an administrator’s acts could be found to be arbitrary and capricious. For example, in Glenn, in 
evaluating whether an abuse of discretion existed, the Court required the consideration of 
external factors, such as a conflict of interest, thus inferring that other factors merit 
consideration.
290
 In, Conkright, the Court, in determining whether the plan administrator abused 
his discretion, considered the factor of acting in bad faith.  
In light of the lack of uniformity on the judicial standard of review in plan interpretation 
cases, the Supreme Court of the United States should fashion a rule with remedial safeguards that 
require judges to consider any and all factors that assist a court in determining whether a plan 
administrator’s act is arbitrary and capricious. Requiring the court to consider any and all factors 
decreases the judiciary’s discretion, but also decreases appellate review as the judge would leave 
no stone unturned. Thus, to cure the current imbalance and assist courts in finding what type of 
interpretative discretion is too much discretion or arbitrary and capricious, the factors should 
include, among others, incompetence, conflict of interest, ulterior motives or surrounding 
circumstances independent from a conflict of interest, and bad faith. 
Moreover, another remedial safeguard may include the help of an independent arbiter in 
the appeals process.
291
 The independent arbiter can interpret plan language and determine 
whether the administrator’s act was arbitrary and capricious. If the arbiter finds in favor of the 
plan participant or beneficiary, the decision can create a presumption in favor of the plan 
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participant or beneficiary, thus shifting the burden onto the plan administrator to demonstrate 
that his act was not arbitrary and capricious. If the independent arbiter does not find an abuse of 
discretion, the plan participant or beneficiary is squarely where he would be had an independent 
arbiter not been commissioned. The independent arbiter could be paid by the plan participant 
individually, if he so elects to avail himself of that procedure, so as to reduce wasteful spending 
of plan assets for individual participant’s or beneficiary’s benefit.  
Conclusion 
An across-the-board deference approach, alone, is unwarranted in light of Congressional 
intent and Firestone and its progeny. As proposed by Tibble, so long deference is granted 
somewhere in the plan, interpretative deference would include defining health conditions and 
benefit determinations. Tibble, in failing to add procedural safeguards to its across-the-board 
deference approach, falls short of reaching a healthy balance so fruitfully sought by Congress 
and clearly identified by courts. The reasoning behind adopting across-the-board deference 
derives from precedent that adopts the spirit of trust principles into ERISA. Trust principles, 
however, are not constant under all scenarios and circumstances. Thus, a change in circumstance 
warrants a change in analysis.  
Trust principles promote discretion when the plan document grants discretion to a plan 
administrator’s interpretation under a certain circumstance; the circumstance in Firestone being a 
denial of benefits claims. The legal ramifications and policy implication of across-the-board 
deference requires the adoption of additional safeguards. A court would be injudicious to simply 
point to trust law as the be all and end all of interpretative discretion, if the plan says so and for 
the sake of simplicity. Each circumstance or plan provision where interpretative discretion is 
granted calls for a consideration of external factors that may outweigh the deference suggested 
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by trust law principles. For example, Tibble’s across-the-board deference would allow plan 
administrators, usually non-medical professional, to interpret medical conditions under a high 
threshold standard to determine whether such condition falls within the plan’s language. And, 
while such practice is exercised today, a compromise must result from increase deference and 
lacking safeguards. Increasing safeguards, in a time where the courts are leaning toward 
increased interpretative deference, is only natural.  
The resulting policy implication would likely avail plan participants and beneficiaries to 
the full receipt of retirement benefits, which results in less retirees depending on the United 
States’ Social Security or other governmental benefits. Plan participants continue to fulfill plan 
vesting requirements to later suffer a deprivation of anticipated benefits because the plan 
administrator interpreted a provision ever so slightly in the sponsor’s favor.  Considering the 
preferential tax treatment and judicial stance on heightened deference, inadequate safeguards 
continue to stagnate.  The continued well-being and security of millions of employees and their 
dependents are directly affected by these plans and plan administrator’s interpretation. A national 
public interest is at stake. Ultimately, implementing and adopting safeguards will equalize the 
balance between plan participants and beneficiaries, and plan administrators.  
